



INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP

Power and Borders in the New World Order

working on solutions to improve the efficiency of the neighbouring instruments: CBC, ENI, etc.

**7-8th November 2019
Oradea, "Gheorghe Șincai" Library**


Coordinators:

Richard SAKWA, Professor, University of Kent (UK)

Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS, Assistant Professor, University of
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Florin PĂSĂTOIU, Lecturer, University of Craiova (RO)



7TH OF NOVEMBER 2019

14.30 - 19.00 WORKSHOP SESSIONS

VENUE: LIBRARY “Gheorghe Șincai”

14.30 - 16.00 - SESSION 1. – Chairman Florin PĂȘĂTOIU

Andrei MARGA, Former Rector of Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania, “The World to Come”

Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV, Professor, Chernivtsi Yuriy Fedkovych National University, Ukraine, “Dreaming Eurasia: Russia’s Integration Policy Drifting from Neo - to Retro-Imperialism”

Ekaterina MIKHAYLENKO, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations of Ural Federal University, Russia, “Greater Europe vs Greater Eurasia: Russian perspective”

Cristian NIȚOIU, Lecturer, Loughborough University, UK, “Resilience and the Security Architecture in Eurasia”

FLÓRA Gábor, Professor, Vice-rector of Partium Christian University, Oradea, Romania, “Idealism, Realism and Minority Protection at the Eastern Borders of EU”

16.00-16.30: Q&A

16.30 - 17.00 - COFFEE BREAK

17.00 - 18.30 - SESSION 2. – Chairman Cristian NIȚOIU

Vladislav VOLKOV, Dr.sc.soc. Professor, Baltic International Academy, Riga, Latvia, "Ethnic Diversity of Globalization: The Case of Latvian National Identity"

Ioan HORGA, Professor, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania, "Black Sea in the New World Order: Power and Borders"

Nino TABESHADZE, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia, "Formation of Post-conflict Georgian identities Case: Abkhazian War and August War"

Florin PĂSĂTOIU, Lecturer University of Craiova, Romania, "Ordering International Relations in Eurasia: Multipolarity and Functional Differentiation"

Sergii SHVYDIUK, Associate Professor, Chernivtsi Yuriy Fedkovych National University, Ukraine, "Decentralization vs Federalization: Problematic Lines on the Ukrainian Borders"

18.30-19.00-Q&A

8TH OF NOVEMBER 2019

9.30 - 14.00 WORKSHOP SESSIONS

VENUE: LIBRARY "Gheorghe Șincai"

9.30 - 11.00 - SESSION 3 - Chairman Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV

Afrim HOTI, Associate Professor University "Hasan Prishtina", Pristina, Kosovo, and **Bardhok BASHOTA**, Associate Professor, University "Hasan Prishtina", Pristina, Kosovo, "EU Role into the Kosovo – Serbia Normalization of Relations Dialogue!"

Ioana BORDEIANU, Associate Professor, PhD in Sociology, University of Oradea, Police chief superintendent, Border Police School, Oradea, Romania, “Outstanding Transformations and Major Changes Occuring at the External Borders of EU”

Dorin DOLGHI, Lecturer, University of Oradea, Romania, “Frontier” as a “Buffer Zone” within the Theory of the Multipolar World “

MÉSZÁROS Edina Lilla, Assistant Professor, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania, “The New American Grand Strategy: Abandoning the Hegemonic Hubris and Embracing Offshore Balancing?”

Klára CZIMRE, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning, University of Debrecen, Hungary, “Manifestation of Power through Borders: The Evolution of Internal and External Borders within the European Union”

Zachary PAIKIN, PhD Candidate & Assistant Lecturer in International Relations at University of Kent, UK, “Orders within Orders: A New Paradigm for Greater Eurasia”

11.00 - 11.30 - Q&A

9.30 - 11.00 - SESSION 4 - Chairman Ekaterina MIKHAYLENKO

POLGÁR István, Lecturer, University of Oradea, Romania and **Mircea BRIE**, Professor, University of Oradea, Romania, “The EU Enlargement Policy towards the Western Balkans. “Keeping the Door Open, but Join Later”

Loretta C. SĂLĂJAN, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth University (UK), Lectures at University of Oradea, “Aspirations and Anxieties: Russia’s post-Soviet Search for Ontological Security”

Albana CEKREZI, PhD Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirane, Albania and **Reina ZENELAJ SHEHI**, Head, Center for European Studies, Epoka University, Tirane, Albania, “Re-conceptualizing Power & Peace in UN: Reflections from the Case of Kosovo”

Pedro BORDA AGUILERA, PhD. Candidate, Universidad Mayor de San Simon, Bolivia, “Geopolitics of the Bolivian State during the Periods of Government of Evo Morales Ayma (2006-2020)”

Mihai BĂLAN, PhD. Candidate, Department of History, University of Oradea, Romania, “The EU - Identity crisis and geopolitical relevance”

Mihails RODINS, Associate Professor, Department of European Studies, Baltic International Academy, Riga, Latvia, “Convergence of China and Russia in the Political Process of EuroUnion”

11.00-11.30-Q&A

11.30-12.00 COFFEE BREAK

12.00 - 13.00 Key speaker

Richard SAKWA, Professor, University of Kent, UK, “Transdemocracy and the Challenge of International Order: Values, Interests and Security in Post-Cold War Europe”

13.00-14.00- Q&A

Conclusions: Richard SAKWA, Andrei MARGA



Abstracts

Mihai Andrei BĂLAN, PhD student in History, University of Oradea, Romania

Abstract. The EU- identity crisis and geopolitical relevance.

The EU was formed after the Second World War as a necessity to obtain a continental complex political structure and also aimed the reconciliation of Germany (Western part at that time) and France.

After the collapse of communism in 1989 in whole Europe, and disappearance of Soviet Union in 1991, the EU aimed and succeeded into expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe almost as a natural consequence but also conquering and expanding to countries which before were influenced or ruled by the Soviets. Not surprisingly Russian president Vladimir Putin named the fall of Soviet empire, “the biggest tragedy of the twentieth century”. Naturally, they viewed this as a security threat especially when EU enlargement went together with NATO expansion.

EU had and perhaps still has to reinvent itself since we observed the difficulties of this (geo)political construct. It faces significant internal challenges, economical gaps between North-South, West-East, the rise of populism, clandestine immigration, trans border criminality, cyber threats, Brexit, different views towards its recalibration. It is not an easy job to understand and adapt to all these.

Brussels is still a huge bureaucratic machine, sometimes with failed and redundant mechanisms where some countries have more influence than others. For example, you cannot compare the lobby capacity of Germany or France with the influence of Bulgaria, Romania or

Portugal. It is the very true realist view that some actors are simply more relevant than others.

The EU had become a voice in international relations, trying to mediate or to express certain views and interests. It played an important role in the Iranian nuclear deal. Also it failed so far in other international conflicts like the annexation of Crimea, the former Yugoslavian war and we still have to see how the Brexit will be solved.

As we have witnessed in history, rarely international organizations or political unions ever were more relevant than big powers taking responsibility and deciding for their interests. The international arena is not a place for morality nor for consensus.

The EU is still in its transition to define its role in the world. It is not clear where it is heading or if it will change or collapse. Maybe it is wise to remember Henry's Kissinger dilemma, "*who do I call if I want to speak to Europe*"?

Pedro BORDA AGUILERA, PhD. Candidate, Universidad Mayor de San Simon, Bolivia

Abstract. Geopolitics of the Bolivian State during the Periods of Government of Evo Morales Ayma (2006-2020).

Since the birth of the Bolivian State, it has been characterized by constant internal and external conflicts, for being institutionally weak as well as for its poor capacity to exercise sovereignty away from its urban and political centers. Thus, the international geopolitical academic debate presented three positions regarding the Bolivian State as a geopolitical actor:

- State Plug or geographical impossibility (North American formal geopolitics)
- Zone / State of distention of interests of regional powers (Chile, Brazil and Argentina) (Brazilian, Chilean and Argentine formal geopolitics)

- Integrative state between regional blocs (Bolivian formal geopolitics)

However, this State has been profoundly transformed during the last fourteen years, both institutionally and organizationally, as well as socially: the density of the State has increased significantly, as a result of the recognition and inclusion of broad sectors of the population, as well as the change of their legal-normative frameworks, the discourses that sustain them and the way of relating to neighboring countries. In this sense, the constitution of the year 2009 establishes new conditions for the exploitation of natural resources within the Bolivian territory, thereby changing the relationship of the Bolivian State with global markets. On the other hand, the marked ideological tendency of the hegemonic party, together with the specificity of many of its agendas, have produced a historical break in the geopolitical leadership of the country, since the Plurinational State -as an identity concept and construction- exercises a new geopolitics marked for speeches and counter-hegemonic operations. Since the 'Diplomacy of the Peoples' - as an ideological and discursive principle - the Bolivian State has established diplomatic relations with geopolitical actors that 20 years ago would be unthinkable -the cases of China, Iran, Russia, Germany, Turkey and India. On the other hand, at the regional level, the integration initiatives promoted among South American governments at that time ideologically related to the MAS political project stand out. The purpose of this paper is to argue about the relevance and usefulness of a geopolitical analysis regarding the three government efforts of Evo Morales Ayma (January 21, 2006 - January 22, 2020), through the analysis of public policies implemented by the Bolivian State during the 14 years studied here that, hypothetically, have marked and redefined the Bolivian State as a geopolitical actor at regional and global junctures.

Ioana BORDEIANU, Associate Professor, PhD in Sociology, University of Oradea, Police Chief superintendent, Border Police School, Oradea, Romania

Abstract. Outstanding Transformations and Major changes Occuring at the External Borders of EU.

The changes occurring in the global power structure bring with them huge transformations at the politics of managing the external borders and the way they affect borders and sovereignty is quite clear because of the involvement of the countries in the global security development.

As an obvious consequence of the development and changes, the recruitment campaign for Europe's first uniformed service was launched by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency: the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps.

Frontex Agency is willing to support EU Member States in being assisted by the Corps which is a unique service and will carry out both border control and migration management tasks. As the main duties of the Corps there will be included border surveillance, check of the documents and joint returns of people who are illegally staying in the EU.

The event will lead to a true transformation in the nearby future of EU and Frontex is going to have its own first uniformed service and it will be able to assist EU Member States with challenges at their borders in a variety of ways, being helped by their own officers and equipment, having the headquarter in Warsaw.

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps will consist of Frontex border guards and national officers from EU Member States and Schengen-associated countries. The recruited border guards, together with national officers from European countries, will be deployed mainly at the external borders of the European Union but there might be such cases where they are going to work outside the EU in countries that have signed Status Agreements with the EU.

Even if at the end of this year Frontex is going to recruit more than 700 Frontex border guards which are having military training as a background, the first Frontex border guards will be ready to take on their new tasks only in January 2021, after being trained in Partnership Academies, where the accent would be first on skills to operate together at the external borders, EU law and ethical standards.

Albana CEKREZI PhD Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirane/Albania, **Reina ZENELAJ SHEHI** Head, Center for European Studies, Epoka University, Tirane/ Albania

Abstract. *Re-conceptualizing Power & Peace in UN: Reflections from the Case of Kosovo.*

The traditional understanding of power sees it mainly as a form in which an actor controls another to do what other would not otherwise do. Twenty years ago, NATO intervention in 1999 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without the approval of UN Security Council favored this approach to power and triggered the discussion on the ability of UN to enforce its decisions worldwide. While the intervention served to question existing principles, it simultaneously examined the effectiveness of non-authorization. The Kosovo Case stimulated for UN a need to re-conceptualize the relationship between peace and power by transforming the notion of sovereignty from a right to responsibility. While conceptually, the Responsibility to Protect has largely advanced since then, practically however it is still fully dependent upon the willingness and interests of UNSC permanent members.

This paper notes the evolution of peace and power relationship in UN as applied throughout 20 years in Kosovo in three stages: the process of peace-making, peacekeeping and peace building. The analysis shows that the case of Kosovo reflects two perspectives: (1) the liberal power approach as reliable to international norms i.e. Resolution 1325 that is about woman, peace and security *where the individual is the focus* and (2) the national power approach as based on hard power *where state is the focus*. In this regard, the Kosovo example is an illustration to the conceptualization of power as an element that produces global outcomes but at the same times constrains and determines states fates.

Klára CZIMRE, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning, University of Debrecen, Hungary

Abstract. Manifestation of Power through Borders: The Evolution of Internal and External Borders within the European Union.

The creation of the current European Union can be approached as a process of enlargements. The accession of new states brought changes not only in the area and number of population represented by the integration but it also always meant changes in the length and nature of borders.

The first EU enlargements (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995) resulted in changes in the quality of the borders (e.g. German-Danish, French-Spanish, German-Austrian) changing them from external borders to internal ones – while the reunification of Germany meant the total disappearance of a former border. These modifications did not only influence the whole of the integration but resulted in new type of problems related to the co-operations with the neighbouring new member states and non-member states. These changes in the area – and consequently in the borders – highly contributed to an even more intensive spread of cross-border co-relations, and thus urged the European Integration to recognise the significance of borders, border regions and cross-border regions.

The enlargements following the transformation (2004, 2007 and 2013) resulted in changes in the borders of the European Union both in quantity and quality, and the changes affecting the ratio of internal and external borders were more striking than ever experienced. This also meant that the length of the EU land borders increased at an extent never seen before, and the ratio of internal borders exceeded the ratio of external borders. The length of the land borders in the EU became three times more than previously, while the length of internal land borders became four times more and the length of external land borders turned one and a half times more than before 2004.

The growing number and length of land borders within the integration led to growing attention on border and cross-border issues. The intensive growth in the number of cross-border co-operations in the

past decades is an obvious consequence of the favourable EU policies since the legal frameworks were ensured and harmonised for the elaboration of cross-border agreements and contracts, and there are more and more sources available for financing cross-border initiatives and projects.

How is power manifested along the borders? How do cross-border co-operations contribute to the power of the European Integration? To what extent do financial supports for cross-border co-operations along the internal and external borders strengthen the power of the European Integration? Which is the best way to express power: supporting internal borders or supporting external borders?

Dorin I. DOLGHI, Lecturer, University Of Oradea, Oradea, Romania

Abstract. “Frontier” as a “buffer zone” within the Theory of the Multipolar World.

The prescriptive analysis upon the potential of multipolarity as an option of understanding the possible future World Order, focuses on centers of power organized within and around the concept of civilization. Within this approach, the concept of frontier has a specific meaning when two or more powers meet/collide, because the frontier is not perceived as a clearly delimited border, but more a flexible space of interaction of powers and interests. Civilization and polarity refers to the space in a radical different manner from the state’s approach of its own territory. Therefore, the “frontiers” between civilizations can comprise large spaces of with social and cultural features which might be associated as overlapping spaces of distinct civilizations. From this perspective, we suggest that the Eastern Europe (The states situated at the eastern border of the EU) represents a particular case where the Euro-Atlantic space as a distinct pole is limited by the Eurasian space. The geopolitical coding of those states should be understood by addressing interrogations such as: Identifying the current and potential allies; identifying the current and potential enemies; the search for solutions to current allies and attract potential; the search for solutions to confront current enemies, and prevent the emergence of potential ones. But the geopolitical coding is

irrelevant if we consider the interests of East/West powers in attracting those states in their sphere of influence, to some extent based on some patterns of the bi-polar system. The East/West debate goes beyond ideology and comprises variables of identity, culture and religion which strengthen the idea of civilizational poles. Within this debate, the theory proposed by Alexandr Dugin suggests the obsolete character of the Westphalian state and the current World Order, which can pose a challenge to the current adjustments of interests and the understanding of regional and international security dynamics.

Ioan HORGA, Professor, Dean of the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communications Sciences, University Of Oradea, Oradea, Romania

Abstract. *Black Sea in the New World Order: Power and Borders.*

The first impulse I had to answer the topics proposed for this conference 'Power and Borders in the New World Order', was to develop a comparison between the *multipolar world order* and the old *Concert of Europe*¹ conception from the perspective of the current changes. Fearing that I would develop a very abstract theme, and at the same time that it might have some speculative aspects, I thought that a case study approach on the *Black See in the New World Order in change*, with reference to the Concert of Europe system and the multipolar order would be much more comprehensible, and at the same time it would be based on extremely rich factual support.

Starting from these data, in the first part of the paper, I will carry out a review of the evolution of the interference between the great powers in the Black Sea region, starting with the modern era with the permanent changes of borders until today. In the second part of the research, I will conduct a comparative study between the idea of *concert* in international relations and that of multipolarism. Finally, I will try to argue, through the example of the Black Sea region, that the New World Order should be viewed more as an evolution in the direction of a "World

¹ Also known as the Congress System or the Vienna System.

Concert" towards multipolarism. From the perspective of IR theory, more likely as an evolution towards defensive realism rather than towards offensive realism.

Afrim HOTI, Associate Professor University "Hasan Prishtina", Pristina, Kosovo, and **Bardhok BASHOTA**, Associate Professor, University "Hasan Prishtina", Pristina, Kosovo

Abstract. EU role into the Kosovo – Serbia normalization of relations dialogue!

Since 2000, in the context of the Western Balkans, "the EU has increasingly been involved in directly supporting peace negotiations in the inter-state and in the context of a third party mediator". However, to further concretize the strategy of action in the field of mediation in peaceful negotiations, in 2009, the Council of the EU adopted the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, as a policy document exclusively related to the field of mediation and dialogue. This document states that "the EU has a lot to offer as an actor in mediation [...] The EU is in an excellent position to provide incentives to its conflict parties and can rely on its wider presence". Since 2011, under the leadership of top EEAS officials, 40 rounds of high-level negotiation have been organized, not to mention countless rounds of technical negotiation. All of these rounds took place in three phases from which the parties reached agreement on 23 issues, both technical and political. The most important of these agreements remained 'the First Agreement Governing the Principles for Normalization of Relations', (reached on 19 April 2013). North of Kosovo within the constitutional order of Kosovo and established lines for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations. In the context of the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations, the orientation to apply the creative ambiguity approach by both the EU and the negotiating parties has been deliberately motivated, albeit imposed by time. There are two main motives that have driven the EU towards

applying this approach. The first has to do with 'ability', namely the fact that EU foreign policy has become increasingly ambitious and inclusive, thereby strengthening both the strategies and the legal and institutional basis, which has potentially created opportunities to apply such complex approaches as a diplomatic tool for mediation. The second is related to 'liability', which means that the application of this approach derives from the prior application of the neutral status approach by the EU. As Elmeled points out, divisions between member states on the issue of Kosovo's status made ambiguity a suitable solution for mediation.

The period 2017-2018 has been full of tensions and incidents in bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia. However, despite these challenges, the EU has not diminished its commitment to encourage both sides to return to continuing the process of normalizing relations between them. In its EU Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans published by the European Commission in February 2018, for the first time the EU firmly emphasizes that the essential condition for progressing on their European path, both sides must achieve "a comprehensive, legally-binding normalization agreement". The term 'all-inclusive' of this agreement once again produced opportunities for ambiguous interpretations. Soon, both Presidents Thaci and Vučić came up with an idea after interpreting the term during the first half of 2018 at an event called 'new perspectives on EU enlargement' held in Austria on 25 August 2018. Controversial for the 'correction of borders' between the two countries, which would be the key to achieving a peaceful historical settlement between Kosovo and Serbia? EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn also expressed such encouraging terms when he stated that "We have just witnessed a very historic moment", which was part of the panel discussion. The controversial idea of a possible border correction, as one of the points of the future comprehensive agreement, provoked a powerful debate on three levels: in the international community, within Kosovo and within Serbia. Realistically, the term 'border correction' was not clear; it was not known whether this meant demarcation of the border line between the two sovereign states, division of Kosovo along ethnic lines, or exchange of territories between the parties! At present, there is no clear scenario on how to proceed further

with the dialogue process. Whereas the Serbian government conditions the dialogue with the abolition of the customs tariff; on the other hand, the Kosovo government conditioned the abolition of this fee by receiving formal recognition of its citizenship by Serbia. This genre really constitutes the abnormality of the normalization of the reciprocal relations between the parties.

Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV, Professor, Chernivtsi Yuriy Fedkovych National University, Ukraine

Abstract. Dreaming Eurasia: Russia's Integration Policy Drifting from Neo - to Retro-Imperialism.

In this paper I'd like to clarify some theoretical notions of contemporary Russian foreign policy, which I defined as a retro-imperialistic. I try to argue why Kremlin policy towards neighbour countries is not subjected to an integration strategy, and on the contrary aimed at their incorporation. In the same time, this policy is hardly a typical neo-imperialistic also. Russia's many attempts of building up "integration" with former USSR countries is going to be inspired with ideal of Greater Russia, deeply rooted in the prominent concepts of 'Moscow - the Third Rome', 'Greek Project', ideal of Slavic Union led with Russia etc.

It's a very debatable issue as to what extend Kremlin inspiration with neo-Eurasian ideals lays in sphere of ideology, or is subjected to rather mere pragmatic calculus. Taking into account those ideas and concepts it's important to analyse the content and direction of Russia's approach towards post-soviet space, starting from 'Yeltsin -Kozyrev doctrine' and concluding with newest coronation of "Putinism" as an official ideology of Russia by V. Surkov. From this point of view, CIS, Custom Union, Eurasian Union etc. are just certain stages towards new re-incarnation of Russian Empire, understood in Kremlin as synonymous to Russia's true might and historical destiny.

Russian Federation stances towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as well as Russian policy of gradual diminishment of Belarus sovereignty seems to be a very provable cases of the assumption why

Russia's policy is mostly retro-imperial and stands far away of what could be branded as a policy of voluntarily integration with partners' states around.

Andrei MARGA, Former Rector of Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania

Abstract. *The World to Come.*

Approaching the world to come I defend two main thesis.

Around 2010, the world has entered a different phase. Democracy was again diversified, with various effects - from the beneficial way out of the control of some dogmas, to the disguised return of a hidden disciplination. Under the threat of terrorism, expanded in the meantime, controls have been resumed at recently abolished borders. Development proves to be dependent on internal efforts, and the national State resumed its role. Without a competent entrepreneurial state, the shock therapies are destroying opportunities. Major problems can no longer be sustainably solved without co-operation. State sovereignty is again a reference point for international relations. It is a deeper plunge into a "world society (*Weltgesellschaft*)" which brought with it a network of interactions that any state must assume in order to promote its interests. Since superpowers and powers try to redefine themselves, the cooperation of different countries is growing in importance.

Some believe world society has become "deregulated" (Amin Maalouf, *Le Dérèglement du monde*, 2009). There is talk of "world disorganization" (Rodolphe Durand, *La désorganisation du monde*, 2013), and some diagnoses signal the cracks of order (Henri Kissinger, *World Order*, 2014). It is not just about the crisis of the world --we are told more recently -- but about the entry into "*Unordnung*"(Carlo Masala, *Welt - Unordnung, Krisen und die Versagen des Westens*, 2016). It is not "anarchy" (as Robert D. Kaplan says in *The Coming of Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War*, 2000), but a "liberal imperialism". *I affirm there is a reassertion of national identities. It may create the impression of disorder, deregulation, or crisis but it is a process that will mark the coming years in the world.*

Decades ago, Ernst Gellner (*Nations and nationalism*, 1990) applied Max Weber's concept of the State as an agent possessing the monopoly of legitimate power and called nationalism the "political principle claiming that political unity and national unity be congruent". However, we are not facing the overlap of political and ethnic boundaries, or the political homogeneity of ethnic communities. The actors and interactions are different, and the world has changed. Therefore, *the current reassertion of identities, which is a new phenomenon against the background of globalization, does not automatically mean a relapse into nationalism*. My thesis competes with both the thesis of the growing irrelevance of identities and the thesis of their invariability.

As we know, Auguste Comte spoke about the „positivation” of knowledge and human affairs due to the progress of experimental sciences, Marx spoke about the „transition to communism”, Max Weber about the society of a „strong submission of individuals” due to the expansion of bureaucracy, Spengler about the „decline of the West”, Dewey about the triumph of democracy, and, finally, Horkheimer and Adorno spoke about the regression of modern society under the „domination of blind nature”.

If is to formulate my idea directly, I would say that, in the societies of the late modernity, people make their history, and they make it within four systems generated in time. I have in mind the economy, where I also include science and technology, politics, where I place the organizing values and the army, the administration, where I include the system of justice, culture, where I also place education and reflexivity. The life of the people of our time passes through these dependencies.

This being the case, to the simple question which many people ask these days, namely, "where to is the world going?" or "what will it be?", the answer most able of factual confirmation is that the world goes in a direction generated by the interaction of the four systems. My thesis is that *the sense of present history comes from this interaction, that it inevitably shapes people's lives, and that world order also results from this interaction*. A variable geometry of economic, military, political, and cultural superpowers has taken place in the world.

Such Interactionism is far better than its opposing approaches. It is about the mindset which subordinates history to some metaphysical scenarios (the irrepressible advance towards something, the ubiquity of

the good or evil, the triumph of some "races" or religions), about imagining a subject of history in large format (a dominant power, an occult force, a fatal coalition, a social group), or, finally, about the mere exaltation of happening in history.

Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS, Assistant Professor, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania

Abstract. *The New American Grand Strategy: Abandoning the Hegemonic Hubris and Embracing Offshore Balancing?*

In recent years, plenty of scholars have attempted to assess the future of the world order, without reaching a consensus. The specialized literatures abound of writings projecting the end of the liberal hegemonic world order, also highlighting the need for a New American Grand Strategy. But instead of continuing with the liberal interventionist approach or returning to the isolationist policy (Monroe doctrine), *offshore balancing* could seem as a viable option. Accordingly, this study aims at evaluating the prospect of abandoning the hegemonic hubris and embracing the strategy of *offshore balancing* in the American foreign policy, which could mean giving up its role as the 'World policeman', instead maintaining a balance of power in a few key areas with strategic importance. The outcome of the American/Western powers interventions in the MENA region also seem to highlight the inefficiency of the liberal hegemonic approach, which coupled with the existence of a continuously declining support for global engagements within the American public opinion could serve as valid arguments for proving our hypothesis.

Ekaterina MIKHAYLENKO, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations of Ural Federal University, Russia

Abstract. *Greater Europe vs Greater Eurasia: Russian Perspective.*

The growth and overlap of interregional projects around the world challenge the Russian Political Elite. In its turn, Russia does not cease to generate its own projects of regional and interregional importance. In the Russian political community, the ability to put forward and promote large geopolitical or geo-economic projects has always been considered one of the main features of a great power [A. Tsvetov, 2017]. Now, the “Great Eurasian Partnership” (GEP) project became a new construct to be explored by the Russian expert community.

Vladimir Putin first introduced that concept in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in 2016. Almost three years after the first report on the project, the public space still has not seen a policy document or a public remark at any high level, which would describe specifically the substance or at least a clear format of this new idea.

The term ‘Greater Eurasia’ is an ambitious project, which was conceived as a contrast to the concept of ‘Greater Europe’. In this study, the authors set an ambitious task to determine what is Greater Eurasia and what are the prospects for its development. The logic of the paper goes as follows. In the first part of the study, the authors will analyze the modern theoretical discourse around regionalism and interregionalism in Europe and Eurasia. The second part of the paper will analyze(s) the distinctive features of modern Russian discourse on Greater Eurasia and Greater Europe and the prospects for its development.

Cristian NITOIU, Lecturer Loughborough University, UK

Abstract. *Resilience and the security architecture in Eurasia.*

The aim of the paper is to map the way resilience impacts the development of the security architecture in Eurasia. In doing so, the article compares these interpretations to that developed by the EU. At the

same time, it finds that the way mainstream studies evaluate the approach of the EU to resilience does not provide a set of tools for analyzing developments in Eurasia, as the approach of the latter is arguably less well defined, underspecified and abstract. The first part of the article surveys the way the literature has analyzed the role of resilience in the foreign policy of international actor such as the EU and the US. The second part, then presents an alternative framework for analyzing the role of resilience in world politics, and applies it to the case of Eurasia.

Zachary PAIKIN, PhD Candidate & Assistant Lecturer in International Relations at University of Kent, UK

Abstract. Orders within Orders: A New Paradigm for Greater Eurasia.

While Russia's vision of a Greater Eurasia has proven useful in addressing certain foreign policy dilemmas, it is still in need of further conceptual development. The paradigm of "orders within orders" could expand and complement the idea of a Greater Eurasian partnership, while also advancing and securing Russia's long-term interests by reformulating its relations with the EU and China in key ways.

As Moscow's relations with Western capitals gradually frayed over the course of the post-Cold War period, the Eurasian vector in Russian foreign policy has increased in importance, rising to the point where it now supplies one of the guiding paradigms of the country's international vision — the Greater Eurasian partnership. Born in the post-Maidan environment, this concept has helped provide additional — albeit still limited — substance to Russia's vision of a more pluralistic and polycentric world, transforming the world's normative landscape and potentially reconfiguring the global geopolitical chessboard.

However, the idea of Greater Eurasia was born out of — and continues to be rooted in — contradictory impulses. These should encourage the Russian elite not to revisit the paradigm in its entirety, but rather to rethink its conceptual foundations so as to alter how it

expresses itself in the real world, with the aim of strengthening the multi-vectored nature of Russia's foreign policy.

Whether the Russian elite chose to make this new paradigm explicit or merely use it as an implicit conceptual guide, it can complement the foreign policy community's mental map in important ways. The community is often accused of being reactive, putting forward an abstract idea of an integrated Greater Eurasian space to stall for time in the face of a rising China, even as they claim that Russia had no choice but to react forcefully regarding Ukraine in response to Washington and Brussels' continued refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of its interests. An attempt to infuse the Greater Eurasia vision with additional content will not only help Moscow to engage with other major powers more on its own terms, but also ensure that Russia can maximize its impact on the future shape of world order by consolidating existing normative frameworks and increasing the number of its dialogue partners. Moreover, for a country charting a new strategy and identity at the northern tip of Eurasia following a quarter-century of frustrating attempts to find a place for itself in Europe, working to erect multiple complementary Eurasian orders would help integrate Russia's various regions into their respective adjacent neighbourhoods across the supercontinent. This would help to secure both the foundations of Russia's multi-vectored foreign policy and its capacity to influence dynamics in multiple theatres, both of which are key to maintaining great power status over the long term.

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Abstract. Ordering International Relations in Eurasia: Multipolarity and Functional Differentiation

While the notion of liberal world order has been nothing but a theoretical fallacy, and recent developments in international relations in the Middle East and EU Eastern neighbourhood call on the return of power politics, the current shifts in the modes of production and the

modes of power towards the East claim for a theory of *new* governance in international relations that it shall avail new analytical frameworks.

The current chapter draws upon the concepts of *cooperative regional orders* and the *hierarchy in international relations* as constitutive and having explanatory power for an increasingly complex and integrated global politics.

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Abstract. *The EU Enlargement Policy towards the Western Balkans. "Keeping the Door Open, but Join Later"*.

The EU enlargement policy has been heavily criticized in the last 10 years for failing to create a stable and developing environment in Europe because of a distinct lack of cohesion between new member states and old member states. This situation is believed to be as the result of a lack of vision for admission states in terms of preparing them for the challenges of EU coexistence. It has been suggested that recently added states, mostly from Eastern Europe, haven't had the time to adapt their societies to the established norms of old member states and thus bring development and culture gaps in the mix, issues that create difficult scenarios in terms of cohesion.

With many of the former Soviet bloc accepted as members of the EU at this time, the process of integrating new members has slowed down. The effects of the economic and financial crisis have tempered the EU's eagerness for enlargement but have also raised questions regarding the future of this process. Is the EU taking a step back away from enlargement policy? If so, how will the process change? These are just some of the questions that can be raised in these circumstances.

Today, the majority of the Western Balkans states are waiting to be integrated into the EU. Even if in the past years the process was promising, the actual situation show that this is a highly contested and

unfinished project. In 2015 the refugee crisis has turned EUs attention and put the Western Balkans back in the focus and on the political map of Europe, underlining the strategic importance of the region for Europe's security and stability.

The European Union accepted and its using a regional approach in the question of WB integration. The main objective is still the achievement of a greater stability among the conflicted states and a normalisation of relations between them. We can declare that this strategy is working, since its achieving its stabilising role, also because each country has applied for or expressed interest in acceptance into the EU.

This paper is aimed at taking a look into what research says about this subject and what is the policy vision proposed for this alternative.

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Abstract. Convergence of China and Russia in the Political Process of EuroUnion.

The increased involvement of external actors in the European Union is often characterised as a new geopolitical game. Appears the new centres and balance of power. New political actors are integrated into the mainstream of international relations with its strong priorities and ambitions. If the members of the European Union are quite subordinated structure with an explicit center of the old democracies and peripheral „newcomers”, Russia and the China obviously aren't subordinated to external actors and establish its own rules of the game and interactions.

The failure of Russia in the direction of European policy has led to a reasonable turn of Russia to the East and a new approach to relations with the EU and the West in general. The idea of active participation in the construction of a united Europe has replaced the idea of Eurasian integration under the leadership of Russia and moves the center of its interests in the Asia Pacific Region. The declared geopolitical

project, in case of his success, can become the largest event in the history of Russia.

There is a China's foreign policy dilemma in the modern practice of international relations, that foreign policy will not be a top priority of China's new leaders because they must focus on domestic problems. Therefore, Chinese foreign policy can be expected to be reactive. This may have serious consequences in pressing foreign policy challenges towards tensions with Japan and with Southeast Asian states over diverse territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. This gap between the outside world's perceptions of China as a rising power and the preoccupation of Chinese leaders with internal problems is a reason of difficulties in understanding of China's foreign policy.

We may conclude that all the three external actors: China, Russia and EU hasn't a desire and resources to dominate in Central Asia. Geopolitical competition in the region seems more virtual and symbolic than real. The European Union argues for democratic reform and human rights in the Central Asian states, an approach that is rejected by both Moscow and Beijing. The EU advances in this area are perceived by Russia and China as interference in Central Asian domestic affairs or as strategies to contain their own influence.

Convergence of China and Russia in political process of EU is fragmentary and contradictory. Aggravation of the degree of conflict and also deficiency of trust and compromises in the field of the European policy of Russia and China decreases towards positive dynamics in the Central Asian region.

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Abstract. *Transdemocracy and the Challenge of International Order: Values, Interests and Security in Post-Cold War Europe.*

'Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.'
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-Human

In our era, it is not so much overt great power ambitions which precipitate conflict as the collision between ordering principles of international politics. These are 'post-ideological', in the sense that we can no longer coherently talk about the clash between ordering principles of social life as the precipitators of inter-state and inter-order conflict. Equally, despite the arguments of Samuel Huntington, it is not the 'clash of civilisations' that lies at the base of the global conflicts of today, although of course civilisational elements (in the sense of different cultures and relations between the individual and society) are part of these confrontations.

My argument is that 'values' have now become the symbolic and substantive driving force generating conflict between states, non-state actors and regional alliances in our day. The concept of values, of course, is slippery, and very hard to define. Values do not exist in isolation but are tied to the norms of distinct 'world orders'. Four main ones are currently in contention: the US-led liberal international order (formerly known as the Atlantic power system); various revolutionary (transformative) agendas, notably today the environmental movement; the return of mercantilist nationalism (often described as populist); and the conservative (sovereign) internationalism of Russia, China, India and some other countries. They represent distinctive normative constellations in the international system. They do so in the context of what this paper calls transdemocracy. The intermeshing of security and normative concerns in a world that remains competitive gives rise to two processes. The first is what Glenn Diesen calls 'inter-democracy', the interaction of the EU and NATO in a mutually reinforcing power system. The second is the specific notion of 'transdemocracy', which describes the elision between security and systemic issues. In the European context, the transdemocratic claim is that security can be advanced by promoting liberal democracy and integration into European institutions. On the global level, this means that the security of the Atlantic power system is best advanced by creating a system of states moulded in the western image and committed to liberal internationalism, the ideological foundation of American power. The post-Cold War 'transdemocratic' claim that security can be advanced by promoting liberal democracy and integration into Atlantic institutions inevitably provoked conflict when perceived to take the form of aspirations for 'regime change'. The

transdemocratic nexus is the contemporary form in which tensions between different visions of world order are played out.

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Abstract. *Aspirations and Anxieties: Russia's post-Soviet Search for Ontological Security.*

This paper aims to explore the dynamic linking state security and identity, by creating a dialogue between two International Relations (IR) literatures - ontological security and aspirational constructivism. Both IR scholarships have deep roots in social psychology and integrating their insights into a coherent whole is useful to shape a clearer understanding for the process of identity formation. Ontological security has emphasized the intersubjective dimension of state identity, whereby consistent self-narratives are promoted across space and time and depend on the external acceptance or verification by others. States experience ontological anxiety when these self-articulations are questioned by events and actors within the international realm. Yet the ontological security literature does not sufficiently examine the domestic components that feed into state identity formation, which is where aspirational constructivism comes in. The latter engages with the internal dimension or the sources from which the state's aspirations and self-narratives draw meanings.

The integrated insights of ontological security and aspirational constructivism shed light on Russia's post-Soviet struggle to attain great power status in international affairs. In terms of domestic aspirations, the main Russian foreign policy schools have radically different views, but converge on the narrative of Russia as a great power. The problem lies in having the articulation verified by peers or other established great powers, which remains a challenge due to the Westphalian origins of the current international system. Although it was an important actor at the time, Russia did not participate in the initial seventeenth century arrangement agreed upon at Westphalia. This turned western states into "gatekeepers" of the international system and transformed Russia into an

outsider seeking entrance and acceptance. Confronted with persistent questioning of its post-Soviet great power status, Russia's ontological anxieties have manifested in an increasingly aggressive foreign policy behaviour, with consequences difficult to predict for long term European security.

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Abstract. Decentralization vs. Federalization: Problematic Lines on the Ukrainian Borders.

The centralized system of government in Ukraine, in addition to its low efficiency in ensuring country's social and economic development, has given rise to many problems. They have been resulted in attempts to make the country federalized or even more they partly supported separatists' arguments (while separatism has been mainly inspired from abroad). Such a model of changing the political and administrative system in the face of external hidden and obvious influences and threats sets a real danger of the destruction of the Ukrainian statehood.

Taking into account ethno-national factor of Ukraine's politics, one should mention that for instance Romanians live alongside State border in Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Odessa regions, Hungarians in Transcarpathia, Russians – in the Crimea and along the Ukrainian-Russian border. As far as the modern history of Ukraine proves, Russia implements its neo-imperial strategy during the annexation of Crimea and set in motion the destabilization plan in the east of Ukraine by means of quasi-republics. It applies among other tools, an ethnic factor - an imaginary threat not even to ethnic Russians, but to the so-called Russian-speaking population. Another factor is the regional one, according to which the Donbass is a 'special region' that Kyiv's authorities do not "hear", and therefore it should at least become autonomous.

The preparatory stage for the acute phase of the Russian campaign against Ukraine was the granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainian citizens and the creation of a network of agents of influence

through national-cultural and other organizations. In this context, the practice of acquiring dual citizenship at the Hungarian and Romanian borders is a concern. However, here, in our view, the predominant motivation for obtaining a passport of a country of ethnic origin lays at economic and social reasons rather than of political ones. Ukrainian holders of Romanian or Hungarian passports may enjoy the rights of EU citizens, for example, with regard to doing business, getting employment or making study, or they may use in Ukraine non-cleared cars as if they are residents of another country.

The Ukrainian response to the public request for the empowerment of regions development, including the border's regions, is to grant them with more powers and resources. So, as a replay to the emerging forms of separatist and federalization rhetoric became the reform of decentralization. Its principal goal is to preserve a unitary state, which means that foreign and security policies remain under the control of Kyiv, while major parts of decisions on social, economic and cultural policies are to be made in the regions. In fact, Ukraine has begun to build a decentralized political and administrative model close to the Polish one.

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Abstract: *Formation of Post-conflict Georgian identities. Case: Abkhazian War and August War.*

Modern Georgian history knows two devastating conflicts which happened in recent years bringing much confusion and disorientation to local Georgian Community. Given article tries to explore the identity crisis which took place after the two wars. As a result of military actions great number of people was obliged to leave their homes and move in temporary shelters. It took only several days to become IDP's (Internally Displaced Persons) from regular citizens. This naturally led to questioning the role of self in community. Such major events as mass trauma generally change the perception of reality and Georgia was no exception. In an attempt to overcome painful experiences individuals, create different responses to traumatic experiences but we have the

opportunity to compare two narratives depicting the emotions of IDPs from two different conflicts. Major aim of the article is to see whether there are any similarities between the perceptions of two different historical events: How IDPs explain the events and their own emotions.

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Abstract. Ethnic Diversity of Globalization: The Case of Latvian National Identity.

The current stage of globalization directly affects the main features of nation states that are developed on the basis of multi-ethnic societies. However, the globalization of these societies and states is not without controversy. On the one hand, the most important requirement of globalization is the spread of humanitarian values, first of all, respect for human rights, including the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities, which are considered as the most important criterion for the development of state institutions. On the other hand, national statehood is considered as the most important subject of the globalization process. However, in multi – ethnic societies, these two factors – the universality of human rights and the desire of nations to preserve their identity-are often contrasted and seen as incompatible. And these features are most fully embodied in the emerging national identity of citizens of multi-ethnic national States.

Latvia traditionally is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. According to data by the Citizenship and Migration Affairs Department as of 2017 in the country's population of 2.129 million, Latvians comprised 1.279 million (59.6 % of the population), Russians – 557.6 thousand (27.0%), Belarussians – 69.3 thousand (3.4%), Ukrainians – 51. 2 thousand (2.4%), Poles – 45. 6 thousand (2.2%), Lithuanians 26.6 thousand (1.3%), Jews – 8.6 thousand (0.4%), Roma – 7.5 thousand (0.4%), Germans – 5.2 thousand (0.2%). The share of ethnic minorities is especially large in the biggest cities of the state. In the capital city Riga representatives of ethnic minorities comprise more than a half of the population (53.8%), in the second biggest city Daugavpils – more than 80%. Moreover, the structure of this ethnic diversity itself possesses the

significant peculiarities related to the fact that the share of the largest ethnic minority – Russians – more than twice exceeds the number of other ethnic minorities in Latvia in total.

The report shows the data of several sociological research conducted by the author of the report in 2010, 2016/2017, 2019 that show the readiness of the Latvian society, its largest ethnic groups to assert those forms of national identity that would include both respect for the rights of minorities and the ethnic majority.